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Victimization experiences and
the stabilization of victim sensitivity
Mario Gollwitzer*, Philipp Süssenbach and Marianne Hannuschke
Department of Psychology, Philipps-University Marburg, Marburg, Germany
People reliably differ in the extent to which they are sensitive to being victimized by
others. Importantly, “victim sensitivity” predicts how people behave in social dilemma
situations: Victim-sensitive individuals are less likely to trust others and more likely to
behave uncooperatively—especially in socially uncertain situations. This pattern can
be explained with the sensitivity to mean intentions (SeMI) model, according to which
victim sensitivity entails a specific and asymmetric sensitivity to contextual cues that are
associated with untrustworthiness. Recent research is largely in line with the model’s
prediction, but some issues have remained conceptually unresolved so far. For instance, it
is unclear why and how victim sensitivity becomes a stable trait and which developmental
and cognitive processes are involved in such stabilization. In the present article, we
will discuss the psychological processes that contribute to a stabilization of victim
sensitivity within persons, both across the life span (“ontogenetic stabilization”) and across
social situations (“actual-genetic stabilization”). Our theoretical framework starts from
the assumption that experiences of being exploited threaten a basic need, the need to
trust. This need is so fundamental that experiences that threaten it receive a consid-
erable amount of attention and trigger strong affective reactions. Associative learning
processes can then explain (a) how certain contextual cues (e.g., facial expressions)
become conditioned stimuli that elicit equally strong responses, (b) why these contextual
untrustworthiness cues receive much more attention than, for instance, trustworthiness
cues, and (c) how these cues shape spontaneous social expectations (regarding other
people’s intentions). Finally, avoidance learning can explain why these cognitive pro-
cesses gradually stabilize and become a trait: the trait which is referred to as victim
sensitivity.
Keywords: victim sensitivity, personality development, stabilization, cognitive processes, social justice
Introduction
Imagine the following situation: your colleague asks you to do a favor for her, such as switching
shifts with her because she says she needs to see a doctor. You agree and take her early-morning
shift. A couple days later, you learn that your colleague never saw a doctor (and never intended to
do so); instead, she needed to sleep in that day because she had been partying the other night. What
you probably feel in that very moment is a mixture between anger, moral outrage, disappointment,
helplessness, and regret. You trusted your colleague, but your trust was betrayed, and you will most
probably decide that you will never trust her again—and maybe you will not even trust any other of
your colleagues. The incident has probably made youmore sensitive to the fact that other people can
exploit your goodwill.
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Although such incidents of betrayed trust are certainly aversive
to everyone, the extent to which people react emotionally to
such an incident and ruminate about the injustice that it implies
differs considerably between individuals: some people merely feel
a sting of anger which quickly dissolves as time goes by. Oth-
ers experience a powerful and overwhelming range of negative
emotions and ruminate for a long time about the incident and
what it says about them. The latter kind of individuals can be
referred to as having a strong sensitivity to injustice from the
victim’s perspective (or “victim sensitivity”). Victim sensitivity
is a personality trait that has originally been developed to mea-
sure individual differences in the justice motive (Schmitt et al.,
1995; Schmitt, 1996). Later, it has been conceptualized as one
of four perspectives from which people can be sensitive toward
injustice (the other perspectives are: observers, beneficiary, and
perpetrator; cf. Schmitt et al., 2010). Unlike the other perspectives,
victim sensitivity has been found to predict suspicious cognitions,
social mistrust, egoism, and uncooperativeness (Fetchenhauer
and Huang, 2004; Gollwitzer et al., 2005; Gollwitzer and Roth-
mund, 2011). According to a model that aims at explaining these
effects (i.e., the “sensitivity to mean intentions” or SeMImodel; cf.
Gollwitzer and Rothmund, 2009; Gollwitzer et al., 2013), victim-
sensitive individuals can be characterized as harboring a latent fear
of being exploited and as being chronically hypersensitive to cues
that are associated with untrustworthiness. From this perspective,
their antisocial and egoistic behavior can be conceptualized as a
defensive reaction to prevent exploitation: victim-sensitive indi-
viduals behave uncooperatively toward others because they expect
others to behave uncooperatively toward them.
Many empirical findings are in line with that notion: Victim-
sensitive individuals are more sensitive to even slight cues of
untrustworthiness (Gollwitzer et al., 2009, 2012), even if these
cues have only limited prognostic validity for a situation in which
one might be exploited (Rothmund et al., 2011, 2015). Victim-
sensitive individuals aremore likely to behave aggressively (Bondü
and Krahé, 2014) and destructively, especially if they sense a risk
of being exploited (Schmitt and Mohiyeddini, 1996; Mohiyeddini
and Schmitt, 1997; Schmitt and Dörfel, 1999). They make more
egoistic choices in social dilemmas (Fetchenhauer and Huang,
2004), and are less willing to help others in need (Gollwitzer et al.,
2005), both in interpersonal and in intergroup situations (i.e.,
when there is a certain danger that the goodwill of one’s ingroup
might be exploited by an outgroup; Süssenbach and Gollwitzer,
2015). They are more envious and more jealous (Schmitt et al.,
2005), less willing to accept apologies from their partners (Gerlach
et al., 2012), and more likely to oppose political reforms because
they think that politicians act out of ulterior motives (Agroskin
et al., in press).
As any personality trait that deserves this attribute, victim
sensitivity remains relatively stable over time: In a representative
sample of German adults (mean age: 47.6 years), 60% of the true-
score variance in victim sensitivity, measured at three occasions
with a time lag of 2 years, can be attributed to a latent trait, whereas
only 33% of the true-score variance can be attributed to occasion-
specific influences (Schmitt et al., 2005). In line with this finding,
several studies have shown that victim sensitivity reliably predicts
social behavior in lab experiments even though victim sensitivity
was measured weeks or even months before the lab experiment
took place (e.g., Gollwitzer and Rothmund, 2011; Gollwitzer et al.,
2012). This stability is remarkable, and it demands a psychological
explanation. What makes victim sensitivity a stable trait? As we
will see, addressing this question requires an elaborate theoretical
framework assuming systematic interactions between social expe-
riences, cognitive representations, and learning processes.We will
sketch such a theoretical framework in the present article.
The overarching question—how victim sensitivity stabilizes—
consists of two facets or sub-questions. A first sub-question con-
cerns the “ontogenetic” development of victim sensitivity: when
do individuals begin to become victim-sensitive, and what are
the psychological processes that catalyze the emergence and sta-
bilization of victim sensitivity during the life course? Our attempt
to provide answers to this question bears on insights from life-
span developmental psychology and personality psychology. The
second sub-question concerns the “actual-genetic” development
of victim sensitivity: how does victim sensitivity stabilize in the
course of specific social situations in which justice and trust-
worthiness are an issue—situations like the one we described at
the beginning of this article? How do victim-sensitive individ-
uals perceive and interpret such situations, and how do these
perception and interpretation processes contribute to a further
stabilization of victim sensitivity? Our attempt to provide answers
to this particular question mainly refers to research on associative
learning and social cognition.We believe that the General Process
Model of Threat and Defense (Jonas et al., 2014) is particularly
suitable to explain how victim-sensitive individuals react to cues
associated with untrustworthiness in their social worlds.
When and How Does Victim Sensitivity
Begin to Emerge and Stabilize?
The “SeMI” model assumes that victim sensitivity is rooted in a
specific cognitive dissonance: the dissonance between a need to
trust others and a stable expectation that others are not trust-
worthy (Gollwitzer and Rothmund, 2009). According to the SeMI
model, victim-sensitive individuals would love to live in a world
in which other people can be trusted, in which the risk of being
exploited is close to 0, and in which cooperation is always likely
to pay off for everybody in the end. However, at one or several
points in their lives, these individuals have experienced that other
people are not as trustworthy and as reliable as they had hoped.
We assume that such victimization experiences establish the basis
for developing victim sensitivity. More concretely, we hypothesize
that if victimization experiences constitute “critical” life events
and if these events are coped with in a dysfunctional way, victim
sensitivity is likely to increase and stabilize. Victimization expe-
riences can have many different faces. Victimization can mean
emotional or even physical abuse, betrayal of trust, or social rejec-
tion. All of these different experiences have one thing in common:
they thwart a particular need, the need to trust.
The Need to Trust
The need to trust other people has been conceptualized as one
of the five “core social motives” (Fiske, 2009). To trust means to
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believe in other people’s trustworthiness, that is, in their abilities,
their integrity, and—most importantly—their benevolence (cf.
Mayer et al., 1995). Trusting others is not only beneficial; it is
essential for maintaining relationships and contributing to social
groups. Trust helps us master uncertain or novel situations; it is
a key component in many social interactions, from bargaining to
loving, and it is considered to be at the roots of economic systems,
the core of social capital, and the driving machine of democratic
societies (Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 2000).
Integrity and benevolence are especially relevant in interdepen-
dence situations, that is, when the effect of one’s own behavior
on the desirability of different outcomes crucially depends on
the behavior of other people (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959; Kelley
and Thibaut, 1978). One particular type of interdependence sit-
uation is the “social dilemma” (cf. Komorita and Parks, 1995),
in which one’s own willingness to cooperate with others or to
contribute to a common good might be exploited by others.
Typical social dilemmas are the prisoner’s dilemma, the public
goods dilemma, or the trust game. The trust game, for instance,
consists of two players (cf. Berg et al., 1995). One player, the
“truster,” can decide to entrust a certain amount of his or her
endowment to the other player. This amount is then multiplied
by the experimenter and transferred to the other player (the
“trustee”), who can then decide to split the total amount or to
keep it all for him-/herself. The principal is: trusting one’s partner
can benefit both players, but only if the “trustee” is cooperative.
The situation described at the beginning of this article is a typical
“trust game” situation: your colleague asks you for a favor, and
your willingness to help her might either be exploited (which
was the case in this example) or rewarded because you actually
helped her in a difficult situation. Trust is the most important
predictor of one’s behavior in these kinds of games (e.g., Pruitt
andKimmel, 1977; DeCremer, 1999), and distrust (due to a fear of
being exploited) strongly predicts one’s unwillingness to cooperate
(Coombs, 1973; Orbell and Dawes, 1981; Kerr, 1983). Given that
trust is so immensely functional, both on the interpersonal as
well as on the intergroup level, it makes sense to assume that
trusting others is something that people are motivated to do in
general.
Theories of psychosocial development echo the notion that
trust is a basic human motive and that the opportunity to lead a
happy, healthy life depends on whether people have developed a
general sense of trust in their social worlds. Erikson’s (1950, 1959)
theory of life tasks (and their resolution) assumes that the very
first task in life is to develop trust in a caregiver. A toddler whose
basic needs (such as food, warmth, and closeness) are thwarted
is—according to this theory—likely to develop a deep sense of
mistrust, anxiety, and insecurity in later life. In a similar vein,
attachment theory (Bowlby, 1982, 1988) also focuses strongly
on the infant-caregiver bond and highlights the importance of
support and caregiving processes for the development of trust and
for the quality of intimate relationships in later life.More precisely,
attachment theory posits that early parent–child interactions pro-
vide the basis for the development of inner working models
(Bowlby, 1982) by forming expectations regarding future inter-
actions. Inner working models correspond to mental representa-
tions of oneself, of others, and of relationships in general. These
representations result in attachment patterns, which can be quali-
tatively categorized into “secure” vs. “insecure” attachment styles
(e.g., anxious/ambivalent, anxious/avoidant, and disorganized;
Ainsworth et al., 1978). Notably, “insecure” attachment styles are
associated with representations of others as being untrustworthy
and of oneself as being incapable (and/or unworthy) of obtaining
others’ cooperation.
Taken together, these theories imply that the capability (or
the willingness) to trust others as an adult may depend strongly
on the kind of experiences people have had in their childhood.
However, this does not necessarily mean that generalized expec-
tations regarding other people’s trustworthiness crystallize in early
childhood. Empirical findings rather suggest that social trust sta-
bilizes later—especially between early and late adolescence (e.g.,
Flanagan and Stout, 2010). Thus, adolescence may be considered
a critical period in life in which social trust crystallizes and in
which people shape their general views about the trustworthi-
ness of other people in accordance with the kind of experiences
they had. Additionally, findings from life-span developmental
psychology have shown that parental influences on the child’s
personality development decrease gradually during late childhood
and especially during early adolescence, whereas “extra-familial”
influences, such as peers, friends, and especially intimate partners,
become increasingly relevant (Caspi, 1998).
Victimization Experiences
Social experiences are likely to shape the formation of trust and
expectations regarding the trustworthiness of others. The ques-
tion is which kinds of social experiences have the potential to
affect these expectations.We assume that expectations concerning
other people’s untrustworthiness are learned via experiences of
victimization (cf. Baumert and Maltese, 2014). These experiences
could include direct as well as observed victimization.
Direct Experiences of Victimization
Childhood and adolescence are rife with situations that challenge
the notion that our fellow humans’ intentions are universally good
and benevolent. In early adolescence, such victimization experi-
ences can include physical or emotional abuse (Björkqvist et al.,
2011), (cyber)bulling (König et al., 2010), or unfair treatment
by authorities (Pretsch et al., in press). These situations imply
violations of fairness standards—standards of distributive fairness
(e.g., equality, equity, or need), of procedural fairness (e.g., the
opportunity to “voice” one’s opinion), or of interactional fairness
(e.g., the right to be treated respectfully). We assume that such
violations, especially if they occur repeatedly and if they constitute
“critical” life events (see below), contribute to the development
and stabilization of victim sensitivity during childhood and ado-
lescence. In addition, experiences of social rejection—that is, being
excluded from a social relationship or social interaction—are
likely to contribute to the development of victim sensitivity as
experiences of social rejection can advance generalized negative
expectations concerning others’ trustworthiness. Relevant expe-
riences of social rejection include parental rejection, but also peer
rejection or indirect bullying (cf. Rivers and Smith, 1994; Ettekal
and Ladd, 2015).
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Observed Experiences of Victimization
Although some degree of directly experienced victimization is
probably necessary for the development of victim sensitivity,
experiences of victimization that are observed from a third-party
perspective are likely to play a role as well. Observing social
rejection, interpersonal transgressions, and violations of fairness
standards might be just as suited to form generalized nega-
tive expectations concerning others’ trustworthiness as actually
experiencing them. Drawing on research on vicarious trauma-
tization (McCann and Pearlman, 1990), observed experiences
of victimization might be particularly influential under condi-
tions that promote empathy with the victim, for instance, when
a family member or one’s best friend is bullied, exploited, or
otherwise treated badly. Notably, observed victimization of (sig-
nificant) others may elicit moral outrage and motivate observers
to fight against injustice on behalf of the victim—but these
observations may nonetheless make observers more sensitive
to victimization. A special instance of observed victimization
is witnessing injustice in the media. Media consumption can
have sustainable effects on normative beliefs, values, and self-
as well as world views (Huesmann and Guerra, 1997; Möller
and Krahé, 2009). For example, Rothmund et al. (2015) have
recently demonstrated that exposure to violent video games at
the age of 14 can contribute to a decrease in interpersonal trust
1 year later. These findings suggest that not only directly expe-
rienced, but also indirectly experienced confrontations with vio-
lence and untrustworthiness (e.g., in the media) can influence
adolescents’ trustworthiness expectations (see also Rothmund
et al., 2013).
Victimization Experiences as Critical Life Events
Building on research from life-span developmental psychology,
certain victimization experiences—both directly experienced and
indirectly observed ones—can be considered “critical” life events.
Critical life events are specific kinds of stressors that can be
differentiated from “normal” life events by several characteristics
(see below; Filipp and Aymanns, 2010). Among these are (1)
the extent to which the event is informative about oneself (i.e.,
relevant for one’s self-concept or self-esteem), (2) the extent to
which the event interferes with plans and reduces the freedom to
act, (3) the unpredictability, and (4) the uncontrollability of the
event. The more a victimization experience is self-relevant, goal-
obstructing, unpredictable, and uncontrollable, the more likely it
will have a strong impact on general beliefs about trustworthiness
and the stabilization of those beliefs. Again, not only directly expe-
rienced instances of victimization, but also indirectly observed
instances of victimization can constitute critical life events that can
shape a person’s dispositional untrustworthiness expectations. For
instance, learning that one’s best friend had been exploited and
cheated upon by his or her partner for years can reduce one’s trust
into others—maybe even to the same extent as having suffered
exploitation oneself can do.
In addition, individual characteristics, vulnerabilities, and
resources (e.g., self-concept aspects, individual norms, sensitiv-
ities, interpersonal integration, opportunities for social support,
etc.) are relevant for how a person copes with the event. The
extent to which a particular victimization experience shapes
trustworthiness expectations (and, thus, promotes the stabiliza-
tion of victim sensitivity) thus depends on characteristics of the
event itself in conjunction with characteristics of the person.
Social Information Processing Patterns
One such person characteristic is how people tend to perceive,
interpret, and react to social situations. The social information-
processing (SIP) model of children’s social adjustment (Crick and
Dodge, 1994) assumes that these perceptions, interpretations, and
reactions to social events are critically influenced by so-called
“data base” information stored in memory. This “data base” con-
sists of general social knowledge structures such as inner working
models of relationships (Bowlby, 1982), cognitive schemas, self-
concepts, and behavioral scripts (Schank and Abelson, 1977).
When confronted with particular social situations, individuals
often rely on this social knowledge. Thus, the “data base” critically
influences how cues are perceived and interpreted and how people
react toward these cues. And, in the sense of a feedback loop,
social situations and their outcomes may stabilize and reinforce
this social knowledge if the outcomes are consistent with prior
expectations.
The notion of a “data base” in the SIP model (Crick and Dodge,
1994) is perfectly compatible with the SeMI model (Gollwitzer
and Rothmund, 2009; Gollwitzer et al., 2013). The SeMI model
proposes that being confronted with contextual cues associated
with untrustworthiness evokes a “suspicious mindset” among
victim-sensitive individuals. Past experiences of betrayal, rejec-
tion, or unfair treatment (which, according to the SIP model, are
stored in a person’s “data base”) thus contribute to a generalized
expectation that people are not trustworthy and unreliable, an
attributional bias including a heightened availability of hostile
interpretations of others’ intentions, and a stabilized behavioral
script that favors uncooperativeness in social exchange situations.
As we will discuss in Section “How Does Victim Sensitivity Per-
petuate Itself Across Social Situations?”, the way victim-sensitive
individuals perceive, interpret, and react to social encounters in
which untrustworthiness cues are present reinforces their cogni-
tive schemas, and thus, their dispositional victim sensitivity even
further.
Ontogenetic Stabilization Processes
In the previous paragraphs we have discussed which kinds of vic-
timization experiences—in combination with particular personal
characteristics—are likely to contribute to the emergence and sta-
bilization of victim sensitivity during childhood and adolescence.
We will now discuss the processes that may be useful to explain
how victim sensitivity stabilizes “ontogenetically” over time. First,
we will discuss self-stabilization and environment stabilization as
two important sources of stabilization according to life-span per-
sonality psychology (e.g., Lang et al., 2006). Next, we will discuss
person-environment transaction processes and their relevance for
the stabilization of victim sensitivity.
Self- and Environment Stabilization
Personality theories focus mainly on three different sources for
stabilization: (1) an increasing self-stabilization, (2) an increasing
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stabilization due to a more stable environment, and (3) a stabi-
lizing contribution of the genome.1 Self-stabilization refers to the
stabilization of self-relevant knowledge, one’s self-concept, over
time (Kagan, 1980). Victim-sensitive individuals might develop
a “victim self-concept,” which includes self-related views such as
“I am easy prey” or “I am a person who attracts the attention
of bullies;” and the stabilization of such a self-concept may, in
turn, increase (and stabilize) one’s sensitivity to victimization.
Environment stabilization, on the other hand, means that social
environments become increasingly stable across the life span,
which, in turn, also has a stabilizing effect on one’s personality.
Self- and environment stabilization processes are not independent
of each other; nevertheless, personality ! environment effects
can be empirically differentiated from environment! personal-
ity effects via longitudinal studies (e.g., Asendorpf and Wilpers,
1998). In general, “core” personality traits (such as the “Big Five”)
have a stronger effect on the environment than vice versa, whereas
“surface” personality traits (such as self-worth or loneliness; cf.
Asendorpf and van Aken, 2003) are more likely to be shaped
by environments. For instance, Asendorpf and van Aken (2003)
found that extraversion (a “core” personality trait) predicted
changes in social relations (e.g., increased support from peers),
but not vice versa; changes in global self-worth or loneliness
(two “surface” traits), however, were predicted by social relations,
but not vice versa. Victim sensitivity can be conceptualized as
having both “core” and “surface” characteristics. Thus, person-
ality ! environment effects of victim sensitivity are likely to
be as strong as environment ! personality effects on victim
sensitivity.
Person-Environment Transactions
Dynamic-interactionistic approaches explain the stabilization of
personality by an increasing “fit” between persons and the envi-
ronments they find themselves in (Caspi, 1998). According to
Caspi and Roberts (1999, 2001), this increase in fit is a function of
four potential “transactions:” (1) reactive transactions, (2) evoca-
tive transactions, (3) selective transactions, and (4) manipulative
transactions. We will now discuss these transactions—and their
relevance for the stabilization of victim sensitivity in particu-
lar—in more detail.
Reactive transaction refers to the fact that different individuals
react differently to the same objective situation. As the SIP model
(Crick and Dodge, 1994) as well as social-cognitive personality
theories (e.g., Bandura, 1999; Cervone and Shoda, 1999; Shoda
and Mischel, 2000; Fleeson, 2001) suggest, cognitive schemas and
behavioral scripts shape how a person perceives, attributes, and
reacts to social situations (see also Social Information Processing
Patterns). In turn, consistently applying these perceptions, attri-
butions, and reactions also reinforces—and, thus, stabilizes—the
schema. Consistently attributing “mean intentions” to others
reinforces a person’s victim sensitivity. In other words, schema-
1Genome-related stabilization effects will not be further discussed in this
text since this would go beyond the scope of this article. It should be noted,
however, that twin studies have demonstrated that a considerable amount of
the variance in social trust is accounted for by an additive genetic component
(e.g., Oskarsson et al., 2012).
congruent information processes imply a confirmation bias that
stabilizes the schema (Nickerson, 1998).
Evocative transactions refer to the processes by which peo-
ple elicit reactions from others that are consistent with their
a priori expectations. This stabilizes these expectations. Stated
differently, people’s behavioral patterns create a consistency in
other people’s reactions toward them; a “self-fulfilling prophecy.”
If victim-sensitive individuals perceive and interpret situations
against the background of their negative assumptions (others’
untrustworthiness) and react accordingly (e.g., uncooperatively),
others may react to this behavior in a similar way (e.g., uncooper-
atively), which, in turn, confirms the negative beliefs that victim-
sensitive individuals have about other people’s untrustworthiness
(see also How Does Victim Sensitivity Perpetuate Itself Across
Social Situations?).
Selective transactions refer to the active selection of environ-
ments. Based on their individual preferences, attitudes, and com-
petences, people actively seek out environments that “fit” their
personality. For instance, adolescents prefer peers that are sim-
ilar to themselves; this preference, in turn, stabilizes behavioral
dispositions due to social reinforcement (Newcomb et al., 1993;
Harris, 1995). Victim-sensitive individualsmay thus select friends,
partners, colleagues, etc., who are similarly suspicious about oth-
ers’ intentions as they are. This “confirms” the correctness of their
(negative) assumptions and stabilizes them accordingly.
Finally, manipulative transactions involve active behaviors that
establish environments which are consistent with one’s own indi-
vidual experiences and behaviors. Victim-sensitive individuals
might influence their environment (their friends, colleagues, rel-
atives, and children) to become just as suspicious as they are.
By manipulating their environment in this way, victim-sensitive
individuals therefore “create” social relationships that are in line
with their own expectations, which, in turn, stabilizes their victim
sensitivity even further.
According to Caspi (1998; see also Caspi et al., 1989), these
four transactions can influence person-environment fit both in
a direct and in a more indirect way. The indirect way describes
a cumulative effect over a longer period of time. The latter one
is also referred to as the principle of “cumulative continuity.” It
assumes that the possibility to establish a person-environment
fit increases as one gets older. This implies that the stability of
personality traits increases as a function of our capacity to select
and control the environments we live in.
Conclusion
The arguments we discussed and the theories and studies we
reviewed so far can be used to describe a model which describes
the “ontogenetic” stabilization of victim sensitivity (see Figure 1).
We started this discussion by referring to the “need to trust” as
a core social motive that is likely to be innate and that requires
attention and satisfaction already at very early age. As any other
motive, the “need to trust” may differ between individuals, but a
certain level of this need can most likely be found in all humans.
Nevertheless, people with a strong need to trust may be particu-
larly likely to develop a high sensitivity to victimization later in life.
Given its strong motivational component, people become sen-
sitive to instances in which the need to trust is thwarted. We
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FIGURE 1 | Theoretical model explaining the “ontogenetic”
stabilization of victim sensitivity across the life-course.
referred to these instances as victimization experiences. Victim-
ization can be directly experienced or observed from a third-party
perspective. More importantly, victimization experiences can
constitute “critical” life events if they are (a) self-relevant, (b) goal-
obstructing, (c) unpredictable, and (d) uncontrollable. Depending
on characteristics of the person (i.e., vulnerabilities, sensitivi-
ties, opportunities for social support, etc.) and—especially—on
habitual tendencies to perceive, interpret, and react to social situ-
ations (which, in turn, are rooted in social knowledge structures,
the “data base”), victimization experiences shape future expecta-
tions regarding other people’s trustworthiness. These expectations
become increasingly stable via self- and environmental stabi-
lization, and, especially, via person-environment “transactions.”
Stabilized and generalized untrustworthiness expectations in con-
junction with a strong need to trust make a person dispositionally
sensitive to victimization—the “dependent variable” in our model
(see Figure 1). Victim sensitivity, in turn, feeds back into the
“data base;” that is, victim sensitivity shapes how people perceive,
interpret, and react to similar situations containing similar cues
(in the SeMImodel, this is referred to as the “suspicious mindset;”
cf. Gollwitzer and Rothmund, 2009; Gollwitzer et al., 2013).
We have also argued that late childhood and early adoles-
cence may be a particularly critical age for the formation and
stabilization of victim sensitivity, because both (a) the need to
trust others—especially peers, friends, and partners—and (b) the
likelihood of being confronted with instances of victimization
are particularly high during this phase. To date, there are no
empirical studies in which the stabilization of victim sensitivity in
adolescence is systematically investigated. The only study thatmay
be informative in this regard has been published by Bondü and
Krahé (2014). These authors have shown that victim sensitivity
can be reliably assessed and distinguished from other constructs
by the age of 9. In this study, the predictive effect of victim
sensitivity over and above other factors (e.g., rejection sensitivity)
on aggressive behavior was examined in a large sample with ages
ranging between 9 and 19 years. Victim sensitivity turned out
to be the strongest predictor of various forms and functions of
aggressive behavior. Interestingly, victim sensitivity was the only
variable that increased as children grew older. This is in line
with Flanagan and Stout’s (2010) finding that social trust declines
during adolescence.
How Does Victim Sensitivity Perpetuate
Itself Across Social Situations?
After having discussed the “ontogenetic” development and stabi-
lization of victim sensitivity across the life course, wewill now turn
to our second question: how do specific instances of victimization
contribute to a stabilization of victim sensitivity across situations?
This question addresses the “actual-genetic” stabilization of victim
sensitivity. We will argue that this stabilization can be reasonably
well explained by associative learning and avoidance learning pro-
cesses. As outlined above, victim-sensitive individuals are not only
characterized by a high need to trust but also by a stabilized and
generalized negative expectation concerning others’ trustworthi-
ness—probably due to experiences of victimization. These expe-
riences are relevant for associative learning processes. According
to the SeMI model, victim-sensitive individuals are particularly
sensitive toward “cues” in their social environments that are
associated with untrustworthiness (Gollwitzer et al., 2013). Being
confronted with these cues evokes a “suspicious mindset” and
makes preventive reactions, such as pre-emptive selfishness, more
likely. Associative learning can explain why and how a sensitivity
to “untrustworthiness cues” generalizes and, thus, stabilizes across
situations.
Associative Learning, Untrustworthiness Cues,
and Trusting Behavior
Associative learning refers to the process by which associations
between stimuli (including behavior) are learned. Associative
learning encompasses classical, operant, and evaluative condi-
tioning. In classical conditioning (or Pavlovian conditioning), a
neutral stimulus is paired with an unconditioned stimulus (i.e.,
a reflex-evoking stimulus) until the neutral stimulus acquires the
unconditioned stimulus’ capability to evoke the reflex; thus, a
stimulus-outcome association is learned. In operant conditioning,
a behavior is paired with a pleasant (reinforcement) or unpleasant
(punishment) stimulus/action until the frequency of the behavior
is changed; thus, a behavior-outcome association is learned. In eval-
uative conditioning, a neutral stimulus is paired with an affective
stimulus until the neutral stimulus acquires the valence of the
affective stimulus; thus, a stimulus-stimulus association is learned.
In the following,we discuss three processes that are relevant for the
generalization (and, thus, the stabilization) of victim sensitivity
across situations.
Conditioned Stimuli
A first relevant assumption is that previously unconditioned
stimuli that are associated with victimization become “condi-
tioned.” After this association is learned, such stimuli function
as “untrustworthiness cues” that activate a suspicious mindset
among victim-sensitive individuals (Gollwitzer and Rothmund,
2009). Importantly, whereas some untrustworthiness cues are
rather idiosyncratic (e.g., the first name of a perpetrator, the
location at which a victimization took place), others are more
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universal: expressions of anger (e.g., angry facial expressions,
aggression-related behavioral patterns, hostile verbal remarks)
are arguably less idiosyncratic untrustworthiness cues as they
are associated with perceived aggression and victimization in
general. In one of our recent studies (Gollwitzer et al., 2012),
participants rated the trustworthiness of targets whose emotional
facial expression varied from happy to angry. Results showed
that victim-sensitive persons were more distrustful of angry (and
neutral) but not of happy faces. We suggest that associative
learning can explain how certain stimuli, such as angry facial
expressions or even behavioral cues (such as a colleague asking
for a favor), become “untrustworthiness cues” for victim-sensitive
individuals. However, it is important to keep in mind that victim
sensitivity is assumed to entail a heightened responsiveness to
any information that indicates untrustworthiness, irrespective of
how that information was acquired. Thus, instances of observed
non-cooperation (Gollwitzer et al., 2009) or the activation of
culturally shared stereotypes (e.g., untrustworthy car salesman)
might suffice to trigger a suspicious mindset in relevant contexts.
Exploitation as Punishment
Two other processes that are relevant for explaining the stabiliza-
tion of victim sensitivity are operant conditioning (via punish-
ment) and avoidance learning. Punishment occurs when cooper-
ative behavior (e.g., telling a friend a secret, agreeing to switch
shifts with a colleague) is followed by victimization (e.g., being
betrayed, learning that one’s helpfulness was exploited). In line
with operant conditioning, one might say that one’s willingness
to trust others was “punished” and therefore becomes less likely
to occur. Furthermore, behavior that reduces the likelihood of
victimization becomes more frequent (via avoidance learning; see
Avoidance Learning and the Stabilization of Victim Sensitivity).
Implicit Cognition
Finally, direct (and observed) experiences of victimization may
not only influence people’s explicit evaluations of others’ trust-
worthiness (via propositional processes), but are also likely to
affect people’s implicit evaluations of others (via associative pro-
cesses). More precisely, victim-sensitive individuals might implic-
itly associate other people with untrustworthiness. According to
the affective-propositional evaluation (APE) model (Gawronski
and Bodenhausen, 2006), such negative implicit evaluations of
others are particularly likely to drive explicit evaluations and
behaviors in situations in which no inconsistent propositional
information is considered (e.g., failing to realize that a different
colleague requesting a favor has demonstrated her trustworthiness
in the past), or in situations in which self-regulation resources
are low (e.g., after having suppressed one’s bad mood at work for
a while, see Hofmann et al., 2007). By default, victim-sensitive
individuals’ evaluation of a new interaction partner can thus be
understood as an affirmation of more general negative implicit
expectations of others (Gilbert, 1991) unless contradictory trust-
worthiness cues are present. Taking victim-sensitive individuals’
implicit evaluations of others’ trustworthiness into account might
be particularly important when it comes to changing their expec-
tations of others’ (un)trustworthiness. Whereas the APE model
describes a number of ways in which implicit associations can
be influenced, research on evaluative conditioning suggests that
affective reactions are highly resistant to extinction (De Houwer
et al., 2001) and, thus, more difficult to alter than individuals’
explicit beliefs.
To sum up, we assume that associative learning plays a key
role in the explanation of (a) victim-sensitive individuals’ height-
ened responsiveness toward certain untrustworthiness cues, (b)
victim-sensitive individuals’ reduced trusting behavior, and (c)
their implicit evaluations of other people’s trustworthiness (and
accompanied affective reactions). Importantly, whereas probably
all people have been victimized in their lives to some extent, we
assume that victim-sensitive individuals not only have more of
these aversive experiences, but also that they experience them
more intensely due to their strong need to trust. More concretely,
a high need to trust is likely associated with more attention and
stronger negative emotions elicited by experiences of victimiza-
tion (cf., Gollwitzer and Rothmund, 2011), thereby rendering
these experiences psychologically more meaningful. Thus, a high
need to trust exacerbates associative learning in victimization
experiences because it increases the intensity of the unconditioned
stimulus (Passey, 1948; Pearce and Hall, 1980)—especially if this
stimulus occurs unpredictably and uncontrollably (see our dis-
cussion of critical life events in Section “When and How Does
Victim Sensitivity Begin to Emerge and Stabilize?”; cf. Filipp and
Aymanns, 2010).
Avoidance Learning and the Stabilization
of Victim Sensitivity
Avoidance learning is a basic learning principle that refers to a
process of behavior modification by which an animal or human
reduces exposure to an aversive stimulus through an avoidance
response. In early studies on avoidance learning (e.g., Mowrer
and Miller, 1942), animals learned that an aversive stimulus (e.g.,
electric shock) was preceded by a warning signal (e.g., a tone).
The aversive stimulus could, however, be postponed with a certain
response (e.g., change of location). Avoidant behavior demon-
strated in these studies could not be explained by a purely behav-
ioristic stimulus-response pattern because the avoidant response
occurred without direct reinforcement (it was in fact driven by the
non-occurrence of an aversive stimulus). Consequently, avoidance
learning was explained as a combination of two factors: classical
and operant conditioning (Mowrer, 1947). First, due to its pairing
with the unconditioned stimulus (e.g., the electric shock), the for-
mer neutral stimulus (e.g., the tone) becomes a conditioned stim-
ulus (i.e., classical conditioning). Importantly, the conditioned
stimulus is assumed to elicit fear when it occurs. Second, when
the organism then happens to perform the avoidance response
in the presence of the conditioned stimulus and thus prevents
the occurrence of the unconditioned stimulus, the fear elicited by
the conditioned stimulus is reduced. This, in turn, reinforces the
avoidance response (i.e., operant conditioning). Thus, avoidance
learning is assumed to be driven and maintained by feelings of
fear. However, cognitive aspects such as expectations are likely to
be involved in human avoidance learning as well (see Rescorla and
Wagner, 1972; Lovibond, 2006; Declercq et al., 2008).
In clinical psychology, avoidance learning is considered a cru-
cial factor for the maintenance of anxiety disorders; it refers to the
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process by which individuals reduce their exposure to a phobic
stimulus through avoidant behavior (Bouton et al., 2001; Mineka
and Zinbarg, 2006). Trying to avoid an aversive stimulus deprives
the individual of positive learning experiences in which the con-
ditioned stimulus might not be followed by the aversive stimulus.
Thus, avoidant behavior is strongly self-reinforcing.
Associative learning and avoidance learning are likely to play
a central role for the stabilization of victim sensitivity across
situations. As described earlier, operant conditioning can explain
how behavior related to victimization—such as cooperation and
trusting others (e.g., doing a colleague a favor)—becomes less
frequent when followed by victimization (i.e., “punishment”).
Consistent with this notion, highly victim-sensitive individuals
have been found to withdraw their cooperation in a trust game
after experiencing victimization in an entirely different context,
such as a virtual world (e.g., Rothmund et al., 2011). Further-
more, classical conditioning can explain how stimuli that indicate
victimization (such as angry facial expressions) are learned and
become untrustworthiness cues. Drawing on avoidance learn-
ing, we assume that due to their connection with victimiza-
tion, untrustworthiness cues may elicit fear as a conditioned
response.
Uncooperative Behavior as a Defense Reaction
Confrontations with “untrustworthiness cues” signal a threat to
a particular need, the need to trust (see The Need to Trust).
As described in the previous section, one way to cope with this
threat would be to avoid the threat. Victim-sensitive individuals
should tend to avoid situations in which they might fall prey to
the egoistic intentions of others and instead prefer situations in
which exploitation is unlikely. For instance, victim-sensitive indi-
viduals can be expected to prefer individual (i.e., independent)
over cooperative (i.e., interdependent) work situations and situ-
ations in which free-riding is rigorously punished over situations
in which free-riding is unlikely to be detected. Of course, these
situational preferences also have an impact on the quantity and
quality of their friendships and, especially, the extent to which a
close relationship remains stable and satisfactory for both partners
(cf. Gerlach et al., 2012).
However, research shows that victim sensitivity is not exclu-
sively related to avoidance-oriented behaviors; victim-sensitive
individuals show typical “approach-oriented” behaviors as well:
whenever untrustworthiness cues are present, victim-sensitive
individuals tend to behave uncooperatively in social dilemma
situations (Fetchenhauer andHuang, 2004; Gollwitzer et al., 2009;
Rothmund et al., 2011), even at the cost of their own benefit.
Notably, victim-sensitive persons are not more egoistic per se;
rather, they tend to be more hostile when faced with injustice.
For instance, when given the opportunity to punish a defector
or to compensate a victim in a third-party intervention game,
victim-sensitive individuals prefer punishing the offender over
compensating the victim, even if punishment is costly for them
(Lotz et al., 2011).
The General Process Model of Threat and Defense (Jonas
et al., 2014) provides a helpful and informative theoretical frame-
work for explaining why and when avoidance-oriented behaviors
turn into approach-oriented ones. This model posits that being
confronted with threat (of any kind) first activates the behav-
ioral inhibition system (including anxious arousal and attentional
vigilance toward fear-eliciting cues) and facilitates avoidance-
oriented defense reactions. Since a state of avoidance is perceived
as inherently unpleasant, avoidance-oriented behaviors eventually
turn into approach-oriented behaviors. These approach-oriented
behaviors can be more or less concrete (e.g., seeking stimulation
or social affiliation; attacking the source of the threat) vs. abstract
(e.g., increased adherence to personal andmoral values; endorsing
punitive systems).
Regarding victim sensitivity, it is reasonable to assume that,
when confronted with untrustworthiness cues, victim-sensitive
individuals initially show avoidance-oriented reactions such as an
increased attentional vigilance toward untrustworthiness. Prior
research has shown that, even in the absence of an untrustwor-
thiness prime, victim-sensitive persons show a greater attentional
vigilance toward justice- and injustice-related semantic concepts
(Baumert et al., 2012), and more recent research shows that,
in the presence of an untrustworthiness prime (i.e., a victim-
ization experience), victim-sensitive individuals are more likely
to associate ambiguous social situations with injustice (Maltese
et al., 2014). Especially the latter finding is in line with the
notion that victim-sensitive individuals show avoidance-oriented
reactions after being confronted with untrustworthiness cues.
Avoidance, however, may eventually transform into approach,
such as hostility, uncooperativeness, and recklessness. In other
words, avoidance- and approach-related behaviors can be posi-
tively related to each other.
According to the General ProcessModel of Threat and Defense
(Jonas et al., 2014), hostile, uncooperative, aggressive, and cynical
behavioral reactions toward experienced or anticipated victim-
ization can be regarded approach-related reactions that aim to
defend or satisfy a certain need: for victim-sensitive persons, it is
the need to trust. Such distal defense reactions tend to reinforce
themselves, as we have discussed before. Uncooperativeness and
selfishness as “pre-emptive” reactions to anticipated victimiza-
tion therefore stabilize over time. Notably, such selfishness may
backfire: Other people may take the “pre-emptive” selfishness
displayed by victim-sensitive individuals as a cue for the fact that
these individuals cannot be trusted, and behave uncooperatively
in return. This, in turn, confirmswhat victim-sensitive individuals
had expected. The pre-emptive selfishness that victim-sensitive
persons are likely to display in social interdependence situations
and the fear of exploitation that triggered this hostility both create
a self-reinforcing system; a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Taken together, experiences of victimization increase avoid-
ance-related (e.g., attentional vigilance toward untrustworthiness
cues) and approach-related behaviors (e.g., pre-emptive selfish-
ness). Whereas direct experiences of victimization are the starting
ground for these processes to unfold, the nature of the behavioral
reactions toward them contributes to the stabilization of victim
sensitivity across situations. Because avoiding social exchange
and social dilemma situations deprives individuals of contrary
learning opportunities (e.g., changing shifts with a colleague who
does you a favor in return) and because pre-emptive selfishness as
an approach-oriented response will generate non-cooperation in
response (e.g., loafing in a joint task), these behaviors eventually
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FIGURE 2 | Theoretical model explaining the “actual-genetic”
stabilization of victim sensitivity across situations.
reinforce negative expectations concerning others’ trustworthi-
ness.
Conclusion
In Section “How Does Victim Sensitivity Perpetuate Itself Across
Social Situations?” of this article, we focused on the role of gen-
eral learning mechanisms for the formation and stabilization of
victim-sensitive individuals’ biased responses to untrustworthi-
ness cues as well as their non-cooperative behavior. The model
that results from these arguments is displayed in Figure 2. Asso-
ciative learning can explain how victimization experiences result
in (a) a generalization of untrustworthiness cues (via associative
learning), (b) decreasing levels of trusting behavior (via oper-
ant conditioning due to punishment), and (c) the stabilization
of negative implicit trustworthiness expectations. In addition,
avoidance learning and self-fulfilling prophecies create a self-
reinforcing cycle which stabilizes generalized untrustworthiness
expectations as well as low trusting behavior both via avoidant and
pre-emptively selfish or hostile behavior.
Notably, some of the processes we discussed with regard
to the “actual-genetic” stabilization of victim sensitivity in the
present Section can be meaningfully related to the four person-
environment transactions that we discussed with regard to the
“ontogenetic” stabilization of victim sensitivity in Section “When
and How Does Victim Sensitivity Begin to Emerge and Stabi-
lize?”. For instance, by selectively seeking social environments that
reinforce their untrustworthiness expectations (“selective trans-
actions” according to Caspi and Roberts, 1999, 2001), victim-
sensitive individuals never challenge these expectations—which
resembles an instance of avoidance learning. And self-fulfilling
prophecies, as we defined them here, resembles what Caspi and
Roberts (1999, 2001) referred to as evocative transactions: victim-
sensitive individuals behave in ways that indirectly validate their
beliefs that others are untrustworthy.
Summary and Outlook
In this article, we developed a theoretical framework (or, rather,
two theoretical frameworks) that aim at explaining how and why
victim sensitivity emerges and stabilizes. Notably, victim sensi-
tivity is not only a risk factor for antisocial behaviors in various
kinds of social encounters (e.g., Gerlach et al., 2012; Gollwitzer
et al., 2013), but also for a number of behavioral problems during
adolescence, such as aggressiveness (Bondü and Krahé, 2014),
anxious and angry rejection sensitivity and conduct problems
(Bondü and Elsner, 2015) as well as symptoms related to atten-
tion deficit/hyperactivity disorders (Schäfer and Kraneburg, 2012;
Bondü and Esser, 2015).
In Section “When and How Does Victim Sensitivity Begin to
Emerge and Stabilize?”, we borrowed concepts from developmen-
tal psychology, research on coping with critical life events, and
life-span personality psychology to derive a model that explains
the “ontogenetic” stabilization of victim sensitivity during the life
span. Victimization experiences and social information processes
that describe how a person copes with these experiences are
assumed to play a major role for the stabilization of victim sensi-
tivity—more precisely, for the tendency to expect other people to
be untrustworthy. From this model, which is depicted in Figure 1,
testable hypotheses can be derived.
First, we assume that victimization experiences during late
childhood and early adolescence increase a person’s victim sensi-
tivity especially when these experiences are (a) self-relevant, (b)
imply an obstruction of relevant personal goals, (c) are unpre-
dictable, and (d) uncontrollable—in other words, when these
experiences fulfill the criteria of “critical” life events. Examples
for such events could be experiences of being bullied, cyber-
mobbed, or socially excluded by significant peers. Second, we
hypothesize that victim-sensitive individuals actively contribute
to a stabilization of this trait by reacting consistently to potential
victimization situations (“reactive transactions”). More precisely,
we assume that victim sensitivity provides people with a set
of cognitive schemas (e.g., attributional styles regarding other
people’s untrustworthiness) and behavioral scripts (e.g., behaving
uncooperatively) that bias their information processing in specific
situations—situations that are marked by social interdependence
and uncertainty regarding other people’s intentions and behaviors
(i.e., social dilemma situations). A third hypothesis that can be
deduced from our framework is that victim-sensitive individuals
actively select environments (e.g., peers, friends, partners, etc.)
that fit their own attitudes and worldviews (“selective transac-
tions”). Such a fit between personality and the social environment
reinforces victim sensitivity and stabilizes it over time. All of these
hypotheses can be tested in carefully designed cohort—or, even
more preferably, longitudinal—studies in which the variables that
are assumed to predict the formation and stabilization of victim
sensitivity are eithermeasured or experimentallymanipulated.We
believe that late childhood to mid-adolescence is a critical phase
for the formation and stabilization of victim sensitivity. Thus,
cohort studies should at least compare age groups ranging between
9 and 15 years (Bondü and Elsner, 2015).
In Section “How Does Victim Sensitivity Perpetuate Itself
Across Social Situations?”, we borrowed concepts from research
on associative learning and social cognition to explain why
and how victim sensitivity perpetuates across social situations.
Associative learning can explain how neutral stimuli can become
“untrustworthiness cues” for victim-sensitive persons, and
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avoidance learning can explain why social expectations regard-
ing the untrustworthiness of other people reinforce themselves.
In addition, approach-oriented behavior such as “pre-emptive”
hostility and selfishness, which may be regarded a distal defense
to threats to the “need to trust,” create a vicious cycle or a self-
fulfilling prophecy: the degree of pre-emptive hostility displayed
by victim-sensitive individuals in the face of untrustworthiness
cues may lead their interaction partners to infer that cooper-
ation is futile, which, in turn, reinforces the expectations held
by victim-sensitive individuals. Again, a number of predictions
follow from the framework we developed in Section “How Does
Victim Sensitivity Perpetuate Itself Across Social Situations?” (see
also Figure 2).
First, untrustworthiness cues are “stronger” unconditioned
stimuli for people high (than for people low) in victim sensitivity.
This hypothesis could be tested in an evaluative conditioning
study featuring untrustworthiness and trustworthiness cues as
well as neutral stimuli. In such a design, participants’ victim
sensitivity should predict the change of liking toward neutral
stimuli that were pairedwith untrustworthiness cues (but not with
trustworthiness-related or neutral cues). Second, victim-sensitive
individuals should harbor negative implicit evaluations of oth-
ers’ trustworthiness due to associative learning. Using a single-
target Implicit Association Test, it could be investigated whether
victim-sensitive individuals associate “others” more readily with
untrustworthiness relative to trustworthiness. More importantly,
the influence of participants’ implicit untrustworthiness expec-
tations on behavior (i.e., cooperation) should be examined vis-
à-vis their explicit untrustworthiness expectations (i.e., victim
sensitivity) in different situations (e.g., under ego depletion; in
the presence vs. absence of trustworthiness information). Third,
drawing on avoidance learning as well as the General Process
Model of Threat and Defense (Jonas et al., 2014), we assume
that in potentially exploitative situations, victim-sensitive indi-
viduals will first show avoidance-related reactions (e.g., a higher
attentional vigilance to untrustworthiness cues), which eventu-
ally transform into approach-related reactions (e.g., “pre-emptive”
selfishness). Fourth, victim-sensitive individuals contribute to the
confirmation of their expectations and create cycles of non-
cooperation through their own behavior (self-fulfilling prophecy
or “evocative transactions”). This hypothesis could be tested in a
repeated public goods game in which players have to decide how
much to contribute to a common good (and do so iteratively for
a number of rounds). In such a paradigm, we would expect, for
instance, that one highly victim-sensitive individual eventually
reduces the other players’ willingness to contribute, which con-
firms this individual’s a priori expectation: that other people are
untrustworthy and harbor mean intentions.
To sum up, research on victim sensitivity, and on justice sensi-
tivity in general, has gained momentum in various areas during
recent years, and most of what we know about this trait so far
is that it is a double-edged sword: in a way, it represents a true
concern for justice and trust, but this concern leads tomaladaptive
behavioral decisions when social situations become uncertain.
Thus, understanding how such a trait that is correlated with so
many problematic behavioral tendencies emerges and stabilizes is
therefore of vital importance, not only from a theoretical, but also
an applied psychological perspective.
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